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MONETARY TRANSITIONS AND PROPERTY RIGHTS: LESSONS 






States have routinely changed the form and the transmission mechanisms of money, 
from the ancient practice of coin debasement, to the introduction of the Euro in 
1999, or the recent push towards cashless payments. Very little has been said on 
the impact that monetary transitions have on money holders’ existing property 
rights. This paper uses the 2016 Indian demonetisation as a starting point to 
analyse, from a theoretical perspective, the challenges faced by states and 
individuals in the context of monetary transitions. This paper argues that the 
process of conversion from one type of money to another can entail substantial 
practical, legal, or financial hurdles for money holders. For instance, individuals 
might not have access to banks, or they could be unable to operate digital payments. 
I define those hurdles as ‘transition costs’. I argue that such transition costs 
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“There is no subtler, no surer means of overturning the existing basis of 
society than to debauch the currency. The process engages all the hidden 
forces of economic law on the side of destruction and does it in a manner 






As Douglas North famously reiterated throughout his writings: ‘institutions matter’.2 Sound 
commercial laws, protection of property rights, stable constitutions, or efficient court systems, 
are all necessary elements to guarantee order to commerce and reduce uncertainty in economic 
activity.3 In the realm of finance, one of the key insights of the institutional economics literature 
is that strong monetary institutions and credible monetary governance are the necessary 
prerequisites for a stable monetary system.4 The system of rules, usages, and policies that 
define what is to be considered money in a society and when it can be used to tender payments 
are another part of the complex monetary infrastructure of a country.  It comprises, among 
others, the rules on legal tender, the regulatory framework and commercial laws on payment, 
and rules on central bank governance and independence.5  
Monetary systems have been constantly evolving, from the times of stone-based coins to the 
new rise of cryptocurrencies. Governments have always retained particular powers in 
controlling the money supply and influencing its use, sometimes altering the composition or 
the form of money to achieve a particular policy or societal objective.6 For instance, in the 
middle ages, Kings routinely debased coins to sometimes appropriate the precious metal 
                                                     
1 John M. Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (1919), ch. 6 
2 Douglas North, Structure and Change in Economic History (London: Norton 1981); Douglas North, 
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge University Press, 1990) 
3 Douglas North, “Institutions”, (1991) 5 Journal of Economic Perspectives 97, at 97 
4 J. de Haan, C. Bodea, R. Hicks, S.C.W. Eijffinger, “Central Bank Independence Before and After the 
Crisis”. (2018) 60 Comparative Economic Studies 183, at 195; J. Fernandez-Albertos, “The Politics of 
Central Bank Independence”, (2015) 18 Annual Review of Political Science 218 
5 Simon Gleeson, The Legal Concept of Money (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019) 
6 Felix Martin, Money: The Unauthorized Biography (London: Vintage, 2014); Jack Weatherford, The 
History of Money (London: Crown Publications, 1998) 
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contained in it.7 More than a century ago, central banks linked the price of notes to gold to 
maintain a stable system of exchange rates that support global commerce. More recently, 
monetary authorities have been pondering how to transition from cash to digital currencies and 
payments.8 Sometimes the change affects the methods of payment rather than the currency 
itself, as the evolution of negotiable instruments over the past century and the recent rise of 
bank electronic transfer show. I define the phase of change affecting the form or composition 
of money or the method of payment as ‘monetary transition’. 
In the context of the constant evolutionary path of money, very little has been discussed 
regarding the impact of monetary transitions on the economic rights that are associated with 
the use of currency. Above all, the fundamental right of property. Money is not only an essential 
tool for commerce, but also a mechanism for saving whose sudden change might impact the 
life of everyone who uses it. Statutory changes as to what constitutes ‘legal tender’, the methods 
of payment, or access to the banking system, influence the wealth of individuals, their ability 
to trade, and in certain cases, their very existence. This essay will analyse the impact of 
monetary transitions on property rights and financial inclusion, with a specific focus on the 
role of money as a mechanism of payment for the poor. In particular, I will focus on the 
transition from notes to cashless electronic payments (e-payments) which is taking place all 
over the world. 9 
The theoretical discussions presented in this essay are informed by the November 2016 Indian 
experiment with demonetisation and its impact on inequality and poverty.10 In the evening of 
8 November 2016, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced that from the very next 
day, 500 and 1000 Rs currency notes would be declared illegal. The sudden withdrawal of 
                                                     
7 Christine Desan, Making Money: Coin, Currency, and the Making of Capitalism (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2014) 
8 Tommaso Mancini-Griffoli, ‘Casting Lights on Central Bank Digital Currencies’, IMF Staff 
Discussion Note SND/18/08 (2018); Michael Kumhof and Clare Noone, ‘Central Bank Digital 
Currencies – Design Principles and Balance Sheet Implications’, Bank of England Staff Working Paper 
No 725 (2018); Sveriges Riksbank, ‘The Riksbank’s e-Krona Project’, Report 1 (2017); Sveriges 
Riksbank, ‘The Riksbank’s e-Krona Project’, Report 2 (2018); Aleksander Berentsen and Fabian Schär, 
“The Case for Central Bank Electronic Money and the Non-case for Central Bank Cryptocurrencies”, 
(2018) Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review Q2 97 
9 In this article, I define e-payment in the widest sense as online payment systems that enable the 
transmission of value. Thus, e-payments comprise both electronic bank transfers, credit/debit cards, 
internet payments, mobile electronic wallets, and other digital solutions. On this see also, World Bank, 
Digital Dividends: World Development Report (2016) 
10 C. Rammanohar Reddy, Demonetisation and Black Money (Delhi: Orient BlackSwan, 2017); Jayati 
Ghosh, C.P. Chandrasekhar, and Prabhat Patnaik, Demonetisation Decoded: A Critique of India’s 
Demonetisation Experiment (London: Routledge, 2017) 
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these notes from circulation demonetised around 86% of the total currency in circulation in 
India in just a few hours; the largest demonetisation ever conducted.11 While the reasons behind 
the decision to demonetise were motivated by the need to combat money laundering and 
counterfeit currencies, the measure had also the secondary objective of increasing the use of e-
payments in the country. The full long-term economic impact of the measure is still under 
debate. Evidence shows that the sudden inability to intermediate demonetised notes and to 
convert them into other forms of money did increase bank deposits, and spurred the use of e-
payments in the cities and among the wealthier parts of the society. However, for those who 
were unable to operate the conversion, mostly the poor and other economically weak segments 
of the society, the sudden demonetisation meant a total inability to intermediate money.12 In 
other words, it meant a sudden loss of wealth. 
At the core of the mishap was the flawed understanding of the practical challenges of monetary 
transition, and how these might affect property rights. In a classical economic model, the lack 
of formal mechanisms of payment would see agents switching progressively to other means of 
payments, such as e-payments or bank deposits.13 However, studies suggest that this transition 
takes time and entails much more fundamental challenges than originally expected.14 In 
between, there could be are a myriad of legal, administrative, behavioral, technical, and 
financial hurdles that individuals have to face. I define them as ‘transition costs’.15 One of the 
main challenges is the difference in the ease of access to the new payment mechanism among 
different social groups. While the transition from cash to bank deposits or electronic money (e-
money) intermediated through the various digital payment solutions can be relatively smooth 
for middle-income groups or those who live in the city, the same is not necessarily true for 
                                                     
11 Ibid. 
12 See Correspondent, Special. "'Demonetisation effects will last long'". The Hindu. Retrieved 2017-
02-26; Natasha Sarin and Lawrence H. Summers, “Most Sweeping Change in Currency Policy in the 
World in Decades”, available at http://larrysummers.com/2016/11/21/most-sweeping-change-in-
currency-policy-in-the-world-in-decades/   
13 Rajeev Deshpande, “India’s Demonetisation: Modi’s ‘Nudge’ To Change Economic and Social 
Behaviour”, 48(2) Asian Affairs 222 (2017) 
14  Bhaskar Chakravorti and R. Shankar Chaturvedi, Digital Planet 2017: How Competitiveness and 
Trust in Digital Economies Vary Across the World (Boston: The Fletcher School, Tufts University, 
2017); Bhaskar Chakravorti, “A Year After India Killed Cash, Here’s What We Can Learn”, World 
Economic Forum (6 November 2017) 
15 Not to be confused with the economic concept of ‘transaction costs’, which refers to the costs of 
trading in a market for firms and individuals. For a more comprehensive definition and explanation, 
see, M. Klaes,"Transaction Costs, History Of," in Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume (eds), The 
New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition (London, Palgrave, 2008) 
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low-income citizens, persons with disabilities, or those living in rural villages.16 Sometimes, 
legal requirements prevent the opening of bank deposits or limit the amount of money available 
for conversion. At other times, the challenges are due to weak banking or telecom 
infrastructures. Each of these transition costs impact on existing property rights and ultimately 
lead to reduced wealth.  
Before concluding, it is worth noting that due to the political context in which it was adopted, 
this episode in India’s contemporary economic life was extremely divisive, and has been 
subject to extensive commentary, a lot of it fraught with political biases.17 It is not the purpose 
of this essay to judge the political implications of the measure or to engage in any political 
debate. Instead, the Indian demonetisation 2016 was chosen because it represents in many ways 
a unique case study for the analysis of monetary transitions. The percentage of demonetised 
cash over total money in circulation, the speed of the transition, the specific economic 
development circumstances of India, and the impact on financial inclusion, are all almost 
impossible to replicate. 
The essay is divided into six sections. After this introduction, Section II introduces the concept 
of monetary transition, explains how it always occurred throughout history, and discusses its 
contemporary forms. Section III discusses the Indian 2016 Demonetisation and its effect. 
Sections IV and V introduce the concept of transition costs and analyze how they impact 
existing property rights. The first part of the analysis covers the conversion from notes into 
new notes and bank deposits. The second part analyzes the particular transition costs affecting 
                                                     
16 I will provide a definition of e-money and describe its use in Section V below. For the time being, it 
sufficient to clarify that e-money (also referred here as digital money) can be defined as digital 
representation of value, different from bank deposits, that is used in certain e-payment system, such as 
e-wallets or pre-paid cards. Thus, it is important to note that e-money is conceptually different from 
cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin insofar as e-money is denominated in fiat currency, does not have its own 
unit of account and, more generally, does not aim at replacing ‘state money’. Since the use of 
cryptocurrencies as mechanism of retail payments is relatively low among the poor, for ease of 
discussion, I have not included in this analysis. On the difference between virtual currencies see, D. He 
et al, “Virtual Currencies and Beyond: Initial Considerations”, (2016) IMF Staff Discussion Note 
SDN/16/03; See also Simon Gleeson, The Legal Concept of Money (Oxford 2019), ch 8-9. For the 
challenges of digital financial inclusion in India, see Committee on Digital Payments, “Medium Term 
Recommendations to Strengthen the Digital Payments Ecosystem: Report”, Government of India 
(December 2016) 
17 Not surprisingly, the decision polarized the discussion along political lines, often losing sight of the 
actual economics rationale underneath. Among the harshest critiques were Amartya Sen and Paul 
Krugman. See Correspondent, Special. "'Demonetisation effects will last long'". The Hindu. Retrieved 
2017-02-26; Natasha Sarin and Lawrence H. Summers, “Most Sweeping Change in Currency Policy in 
the World in Decades”, available at http://larrysummers.com/2016/11/21/most-sweeping-change-in-
currency-policy-in-the-world-in-decades/ 
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the conversion of cash into e-money that enables the use of digital payment solutions. Section 
VI provides concluding observations on the impact of monetary transitions on inequality and 
discrimination.  
 
II. MONETARY TRANSITIONS IN MONETARY LAW 
The relationship between the state, money, and commerce has always been a turbulent one. 
While money has always been a tool to facilitate commerce, kings and governments have 
nevertheless meddled with it long before the creation of modern central banks.18 The 
prerogative powers of the states when it comes to money have always been a function of the 
political power of the institution in charge of the country, irrespective of its form as a monarchy 
or a democratically elected government.19  
 
A. Monetary Sovereignty 
Under the modern concept of monetary sovereignty, one of the main functions of the state is 
to decide upon the type of medium of payments legally recognized as valid to settle financial 
obligations within the state’s jurisdiction, and to associate a monetary value to the notes issued 
by the central bank.20 According to the ‘state theory’ of money, originally developed by G.F. 
Knapp and later on by Mann, only chattels that find their value and use determined by law and 
issued with the authority of the state can be considered as money.21 Thus, money does not 
acquire its value because of the raw material used in its production or with reference of other 
units of account, but simply through the credibility of the state which promises to keep the 
value of the state money in circulation intact over time. What economist call “fiat money”.22  
As acutely observed by Gleeson, the fact that a state has declared notes as money and attached 
them a fixed value does not automatically guarantee that people will use them in their daily 
                                                     
18 Emily Gilbert an Heric Helleiner (eds), Nation States and Money: The Past, Present, and Future of 
National Currencies (London: Routledge, 1999) 
19 Desan, Making Money, note 7 above, at 11 
20 See, Claus Zimmerman, A Contemporary Concept of Monetary Sovereignty (Oxford University 
Press, 2013); See also, Rosa Maria Lastra, International Financial and Monetary Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2015), at 1-28 
21 Knapp, Staatliche Theorie des Geldes (4th edn, 1923) , translated by Lucas and Bonar, State Theory 
of Money (1924; abridged edn, A.M. Kelley, 1973); Charles Proctor, Mann on the Legal Aspects of 
Money (Oxford University Press, 2015), at 15-25 
22 Michael McLeay, Amar Radia and Ryland Thomas, “Money in the Modern Economy: An 
Introduction”, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin Q1 (2014) 
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life.23 As we have recently seen in Venezuela and during many other economic crises around 
the world, when monetary institutions are perceived as weak, citizens overwhelmingly prefer 
to trade with US Dollars or Euros rather than the local currency.24 Very often, state money 
competes and coexists with unofficial money, such as virtual currencies or informal credit, 
simply because certain social groups find it more convenient to discharge their debts. To 
guarantee that only the “official” state currency is used for monetary transactions within the 
jurisdiction, or to give it an advantage as the main mechanism of payment, states have devised 
a legal artifice whereby the validity of notes and coins is set by statute rather than by reference 
to an underlying asset. Unless otherwise agreed, only those notes that were certified as “legal 
tender” by the government could be legally used by citizens to discharge debts, especially the 
debts against the state.25  
The concept of legal tender has narrowed dramatically nowadays, as people and firms prefer 
to pay via bank transfer or e-payments. In its widest form, it means that a payee who receives 
notes that have status of legal tender in the country cannot in principle refuse to accept them as 
means of payment for the discharge of the debt unless a different payment method is envisaged 
in the contract.26 Yet, concerning the current analysis, in countries that rely predominantly on 
cash such as India, the definition of legal tender has a fundamental impact because it can still 
determine what money most individuals can use to pay their debts and exert their role as traders 
and consumers in the society. 
Moreover, it is important to stress that one of the consequences of the state playing a pivotal 
role in controlling the mechanisms of credit and payment in the country, is that it is up to the 
government to ensure that the value of money remains stable over time. Indeed, if we accept 
that it is the state that decides what is money and what value it holds, then it is the state that 
must guarantee that monetary changes do not impact on existing property rights. As I will 
reiterate multiple times in this essay, a change in the value of money or in what constitutes 
money indeed impacts heavily on the property rights of individuals that hold it, as it deprives 
them of the monetary value associated with their notes or bank deposits. Thus, one of the 
corollaries of the state theory of money is that, monetary stability is fundamentally a public 
                                                     
23 Gleeson, The Legal Concept of Money, note 5 above, at 24 
24 Kurt Schuler, ‘Some History and Theory on Dollarization’, (2005) 25 Cato Journal 115 
25 According to William Blackstone, “as money is the medium of commerce, it is the king's prerogative, 
as the arbiter of domestic commerce, to give it authority or make it current [that is, to declare it to be 
legal tender]. The king may also at any time decry, or cry down, any coin of the kingdom, and make it 
no longer current”. http://www.thegoldstandardnow.org/key-blogs/1404-coinage-and-sovereignty  
26 See, Proctor, Mann on the Legal Aspects of Money, note 21 above 
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policy objective that has to be protected by law. In this light, it is easy to see why the 
progressive grabbing of monetary mechanisms in the hands of the state has been accompanied 
by the creation of legal institutions that reduce political control over money and insulate money 
from the vagaries of political cycles.27 For instance, central banks, the government agencies 
tasked with managing the monetary aspects of the country, have  acquired special statutory 
and, in certain cases, constitutional powers to conduct monetary operations independently of 
political controls.28 Various studies indeed suggest that strong monetary institutions and central 
bank independence do lead to economic growth and ease of doing business.29 
 
B. Monetary Transitions Today: Demonetisation and De-Cashing 
Since medieval times, governments have used money to recalibrate the society’s costs of 
participating in an economic polity, and to redistribute property between groups and the state. 
Within their powers, states have routinely changed the form, value, and transmission 
mechanisms of money. The state, being a monopolist on the issuing of legal currency, has the 
power to decide the value of money against other assets and, crucially for what concerns the 
present discussion, the type of currency in circulation. I define the process of monetary change 
from one form of money to another as ‘monetary transition’. For instance, de-basement – the 
practice of reducing the value of coins by altering the quantity of metals in it - was quite a 
common way for kings to gain wealth at the expense of citizens while not altering the amount 
of coins in circulation.30 In the 17th century Mixed Monies case, the Privy Council ruled that 
“as the King by his prerogative may make money of what matter and form he pleaseth, and 
                                                     
27 Charles Goodhart and Rosa M. Lastra, ‘Populism and Central Bank Independence’, Open Econ Rev 
49 (2018), 
28 Charles Goodhart, The Evolution of Central banks (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1988); 
Francois Gianviti, “The Objectives of Central banks”, in Mario Giovanoli and Diego Devos (eds) 
International Monetary and Financial Law: The Global Crisis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010); Fernandez-Albertos, ‘The politics of central bank independence’, note 4 above; de Haan, 
‘Central Bank Independence Before and After the Crisis’, note 4 above, at 195 
29 Aberto Alesina and Larry H. Summers, ‘Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic 
Performance: Some Comparative Evidence’, (1993) 25 Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 151  
30 See, for instance, Anthony A. Barrett, “The Invalidation of Currency in the Roman Empire: The 
Claudian Demonetization of Caligula’s Aes”, in G. M. Paul and M. Ierardi (eds) Roman Coins and 
Public Life Under the Empire (Ann Arbor 1999) 
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establish the standard of it, so may he change his money in substance and impression, and 
enhance or debase the value of it, or entirely decry and annul it’.31 
States retain the very same powers nowadays. Within their powers to control the currency, 
governments enjoy the prerogative to change the notes that constitute legal tender.32  This can 
entail the issuance of new notes and coins with higher or lower value, but also the withdrawal 
from circulation of notes and coins that then cease to be recognized as valid legal tender. This 
latter measure is usually called “demonetisation”. Inflation, technological developments in 
minting, and other economic changes have always forced governments to change the type and 
value of notes in circulation. Yet, when we refer to demonetisation, we specifically refer to the 
process of stripping notes or coins from their legal status as money.  
In the recent history of finance, there are various examples of demonetisation around the world. 
Before the 2016 demonetisation exercise, India had already demonetised various sets of notes 
in 1946 and 1978. At the onset of the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991 under Gorbachev, Russia 
demonetised the 50-Ruble and 100-Ruble notes.33 In certain cases, the reason behind the 
demonetisation was to catch up with spiralling inflation. For instance, in Russia 1991 and 
Zimbabwe 2015, the government had no other option than to print new currency and withdraw 
the larger denomination notes to maintain the purchasing price of the currency at a manageable 
level.34 However, in most circumstances, the reason behind the demonetisation is more 
“institutional”: to combat “dirty money”. 
There is a very well-developed literature that demonstrates that criminals have a very high 
appetite for high-denomination notes as they are easier to transport. Moreover, when it comes 
to counterfeited currency, high-denomination notes are clearly preferred as their relative cost 
of production and distribution is proportionally lower than small notes.35 For instance, in the 
very well-known English law case – Banco de Portugal v Waterlow & Sons Ltd - the 
Portuguese government’s decision to demonetise the entire set of 500 Escudo notes was due to 
                                                     
31 The Case of Mixed Money (1605); For a good discussion on the case, see David Fox “The Case of 
Mixed Monies (1604)”, in D. Fox and W. Ernst (eds) Money in the Western Legal Tradition: Middle 
Ages to Bretton Woods (Oxford 2016); see also, Desan, note 7 above, at 269-272 
32 The Royal Mint, Guidelines on Legal Tender, available at 
https://www.royalmint.com/aboutus/policies-and-guidelines/legal-tender-guidelines/  
33 Ameya Patyl, “History of Demonetisation - Case Studies” (December 25, 2016). Chronicle of Neville 
Wadia Institute of Management Studies and Research, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2996104  
34 Ibid. 
35 Peter Sands, “Making it Harder for the Bad Guys: The Case for Eliminating High Denomination 
Notes,” (2016) M-RCBG Associate Working Paper No. 52  
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the fact that half of the notes in circulation were forged.36 Finally, in certain circumstances, the 
demonetisation of notes is a strategy to combat tax evasion. The rationale here is to force 
individuals that are converting their demonetised notes at the bank to declare their provenance. 
This latter strategy was, for instance, one of the reasons behind all India’s demonetisations 
since 1946.37 For these reasons, in the last decades, a handful of countries have decided to 
withdraw large denomination notes from circulation.38 These include the 2016 decision of the 
European Central bank to demonetised the 500 Euro notes, the 2000 withdrawal of the $1000 
banknote by Canada, and the withdrawal of the infamous $10,000 banknote by Singapore in 
2014.39  
Most of the time, the process of demonetisation entails the replacement of notes, with other 
notes that are of lower denomination or are more difficult to counterfeit. However, when the 
withdrawal of notes from circulation is not compensated by the issuance of an equivalent 
amount in other denomination notes, the literature refers to “de-cashing”.40 In this event, the 
demonetisation leads to a progressive conversion of notes into bank deposits with the ultimate 
result that payments will have to be processed electronically through banking networks or 
digital payment providers. Even though only a few countries have set the course to become a 
cashless society, the drive towards digital payments taking place all over the world has 
triggered increased interest from governments to reduce the amount of cash in circulation. The 
reasons are very similar to those discussed before: to achieve better control over firms and 
individuals’ wealth and financial transactions for tax reasons, to get a cheaper and more 
efficient payment system that reduces the costs of managing cash for the central bank. 41  Some 
commentators argue that cashless economies would give central banks much better control 
over the monetary policy.42  
 
 
                                                     
36 Banco de Portugal v Waterlow & Sons Ltd, (1932) AC 452; for a good description of the case, see C. 
Bamford, Principles of International Financial Law (Oxford 2015), at 26-27 
37 Patyl, “History of Demonetisation”, note 33 above; See, Reddy, Demonetisation and Black Money, 
note 10 above, at 42-44 
38 P. Sands, “Making it Harder for the Bad Guys”, note 35 above 
39 Alexei Kireyev, “The Macroeconomics of De-Cashing”, (2017) IMF Working Paper WP/17/71, at 6 
40 Ibid 
41 Ben Dyson and Graham Hodgson, Digital Cash: Why Central banks Should Start Issuing Electronic 
Money (London 2016) 
42 Kenneth Rogoff, The Curse of Cash (Cambridge 2016); K. Rogoff, “Costs and Benefits to Phasing 
Out Paper Currency”, (2014) NBER Working Paper 20126  
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III. THE 2016 INDIA DEMONETISATION EXPERIMENT 
With this background knowledge, it is now time to discuss the demonetisation experiment that 
took place in India in 2016. Before continuing, it is important to reiterate that it is not the 
objective of this paper to discuss the merit of the demonetisation decision and the long-term 
impact it had on the Indian economy. Rather, this event is useful to elucidate the costs of 
monetary transitions from cash to electronic payments, and the impact that access to payments 
has on property rights.  
 
A. Financial Inclusion and Black Money 
In the run up to the demonetisation decision India was, like many other countries, in the midst 
of a digital payment revolution.43 With a burgeoning economy of 1.2 billion citizens, a record-
breaking 1 billion phone subscriptions, and a thriving IT sector, the Indian economy was on 
the frontline of the digital shift.44 The Indian government’s Aadhar biometric digital 
identification system launched in 2009 had for the first time provided a unique government 
identity card to hundreds of millions of individuals, thus enabling them to receive welfare 
payments, and access a number of public services.45 More importantly in the context of this 
analysis, the use of Aadhar seriously tackled one of the key issues of digital payment: the need 
to link a payment instrument to an individual as required by money laundering and know-your-
customer regulation.46  
Behind the hype, however, the Indian economy faced critical problems. As of 2014, only 53% 
of the Indian population had access to formal financial services, with much lower percentages 
in rural parts of the country.47 This was primarily due to a chronic poverty problem that made 
offering financial services to poor unprofitable for banks, operational costs of running banking 
operations in rural areas, and low financial literacy.48 The Indian government’s initiative 
                                                     
43 See, Boston Consulting Group and Google, Digital Payments 2020: The Making of a $500 Billion 
Ecosystem in India (July 2016); Visa, Accelerating the Growth of Digital Payments in India: A Five-
Year Outlook (October 2016) 
44 Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, ‘Press Release - Highlights of Telecom Subscription Data as 
on 31st August 2016’ 
45 Shankar Aiyar, Aadhaar: A Biometric History of India's 12-Digit Revolution (Westland, 2017) 
46 Boston Consulting Group Digital Payments 2020, note 43 above, at 12 
47 World Bank, Financial Inclusion Index Data (2014) 
48 Emily Middleton, ‘Inclusive Digital Transformation in India: Improving Digital Financial Services 
for the Poor Through Human-Centered Design’, (2018) Belfer Center for Science and International 
Affairs Paper (2018) 
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Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana set to open basic bank accounts for all unbanked individuals, 
but not surprisingly this proved to be a Herculean task fraught with complexities, from bank 
infrastructure deployment to connectivity issues.49 The Telecom and internet networks, while 
extended and upgraded considerably over the years, still did not offer the guarantee of universal 
coverage and the continuous service necessary for digital financial services to work reliably. 
Estimates suggest huge location and gender imbalances among mobile-internet users, with 70% 
of users in cities, and only 17% of those being women.50 
Not surprisingly, India was one the countries in the world with the highest usage of cash, with 
around 78% of all consumer transactions made with notes. This was much higher than any 
other country at a similar stage of economic development, not to mention more developed 
economies. A survey showed that less than 10% of Indians had ever used non-cash payments 
in their life, while only 3% of the total value transacted by cards was done through mobile 
banking.51 Despite the staggering costs of using cash in terms of time spent traveling to ATM 
or branches to withdraw notes, fees, printing and distribution costs for banks, cash provides 
unique features that explain its widespread use.52 First, cash does not require users to be 
banked, as by definition it passes from hand to hand without ‘reference to the credit or person 
who offers it’.53 This means that a person who tenders cash in payment of debt does not need 
to go through credit or identity checks, as the payment with notes is immediately final. 
Unbanked individuals will therefore be able to use payment services without the need to pass 
through the banking network. Second, the legal genius of negotiable instruments – including 
notes - is indeed that their physical possession equals their property right. Thus, as long as 
individuals are able to store cash safely, they can use it as a saving device, albeit with no interest 
accrued. In a country like India, where only 35% of the population is bank-active, the lack of 
financial inclusion meant that cash was used not only for payment purposes but as a saving 
                                                     
49 RBI Committee on Medium Term Path on Financial Inclusion, Report of the Committee on Medium 
Term Path on Financial Inclusion (Reserve Bank of India, 2015) 
50 Hani Zainulbhai, ‘Global Tech Companies See India’s Vast Offline Population as Untapped Market’, 
PEW Research Center (6 April 2016), available at http://pewrsr.ch/207ykqG  
51 The Institute for Business in the Global Context, The Cost of Cash in India (Boston 2014), at 6 
52 Ibid, at 21 
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passes freely from hand to hand in the community in final discharge of debts and full payment of 
commodities, being accepted equally without reference to the character or credit of the person 
who offers it”. 1899] 2 QB 111, 116, 
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tool for poor, with a staggering ratio of 51% of money held in bills and coins versus bank 
accounts.54 
On the other hand, the anonymity of cash and its replicable physical features present 
fundamental costs.55 First, cash enables only person-to-person transactions, thus making long-
distance payments impossible. This hinders commerce as it reduces the scope of the payment 
economy to the village size. Second, notes are very easy to counterfeit compared to other types 
of money registered electronically, such as bank deposit. Indeed, counterfeiting was plaguing 
the Indian economy, with RBI statistics suggesting a 300% increase in counterfeit notes in the 
2006-2016 period.56 Counterfeiting notes not only undermines the confidence of the public in 
the role of the national currency as a means of payment, but crucially it erodes the central 
bank’s control on its monetary value. The more counterfeited notes in circulation, the lower 
the purchasing power in real terms of valid notes. Finally, because of its anonymity, cash is 
typically a conduit for the proceeds of crime and a vehicle of tax evasion. In India, where 90% 
of jobs are not declared to tax authorities, the size of the informal economy contributed to 40% 
of the GDP.57 Not surprisingly, this was the main stated objective behind the demonetisation 
decision.  
 
B. The 2016 Demonetisation and Its Effect 
On the evening of 8 November 2016, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi made the public 
announcement that, from the very next day, all 500 and 1000 Rs currency notes would be 
withdrawn from circulation and made illegal. Note holders were given only a few weeks to 
convert them into other denomination notes, bank deposit, or digital money. Depending on the 
total amount deposited, only those notes whose legitimate provenance was proved could be 
converted.58 This move effectively demonetized in a matter of hours around 86% of the total 
notes in use in India, and created a state of chaos that resulted in days of queues in front of 
banks, loss of jobs, and a general slowdown of retail commerce and industry across the 
                                                     
54 For instance, the same ratio in Egypt is (29.3%), South Africa (8.9%), and Mexico (8.7%) See, The 
Cost of Cash in India, note 51 above, at 5 
55 Ibid; Rogoff, The Curse of Cash, note 42 above; Rogoff, “Costs and Benefits”, note 42 above 
56 Reddy, Demonetisation and Black Money, note 10 above, at 65-67 
57 The Cost of Cash in India, note 51 above, at 5 
58 Initially, the Indian Gazette notification gave a deadline of seven weeks (until the 31st December 
2016) to convert the notes. This was then changed multiple times.  
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country.59 The stated objectives of the demonetisation exercise were twofold: first, the 
withdrawal of 500 and 1000 Rs notes was supposed to fight black money, eliminate counterfeit 
notes, and stop terrorism financing.60 Second, the government saw this move as an incentive 
to move towards a cashless society in which payments would be executed through digital 
means.  This latter objective is particularly important in the context of the fight against financial 
exclusion and inequality, one of the major barriers to economic and social development in 
India.61  
Despite the Indian government’s goodwill, the immediate aftermath of the demonetisation 
decision saw an Indian society neatly broken into two sides, along a digital divide that 
exemplifies the inequalities of modern India.62 On the one side were those with access to digital 
payments technology or bank accounts; mostly the rich and those living in the cities. Together 
with them were all the businesses that rely on e-commerce, and the various payments start-ups, 
which benefitted from the sudden need for Indians to use their services.63 For those groups, 
converting money from cash into bank deposit was relatively easy, albeit costly. On the other 
side were the poor with very limited access to telecom networks and low digital literacy; those 
who were forced to queue for days at the banks to switch the old notes for the new ones, who 
had their cash payments refused and were essentially locked out of the economy.64 Not 
surprisingly, the decision was immediately criticized by various commentators, who 
questioned the unnecessary hurry to execute the withdrawal of the notes, the absence of clear 
instructions and support from the government, and the actual ability of the measure to achieve 
the stated goals.65 From a legal perspective, a few commentators suggested that the measure 
                                                     
59 Amy Kazmin and Simon Mundi, ‘India struggles to digest withdrawal of high-value banknotes’, 
Financial Times (9 November 2016); Amy Kazmin, ‘Counting the cost of India’s cash shortage’, 
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60 Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Speech on 8th November 2016.  
61 On financial inclusion, see World Bank, Finance for All? Policies and Pitfalls in Expanding Access 
(Washington DC: The World Bank, 2008); Stuart Rutherford, Jonathan Morduch, and Daryl Collins, 
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2017-02-26; Natasha Sarin and Lawrence H. Summers, “Most Sweeping Change in Currency Policy in 
the World in Decades”, available at http://larrysummers.com/2016/11/21/most-sweeping-change-in-
currency-policy-in-the-world-in-decades/  
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violated key constitutional rights and constituted an undue abuse of power.66 Not surprisingly, 
in the months after the decision, the Indian Constitutional Court has been flooded with cases 
on the demonetisation.67  
 
IV. MONETARY TRANSITIONS AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 
A lot has been said on the demonetisation’s long-term impact on economic growth in India, its 
success in curbing black money and tax evasion, and in reducing financial exclusion.68 Very 
little, on the other hand, has been said on the legal implications of the measure and its impact 
on property rights, in particular.69 The uniqueness of the event in terms of the huge size of 
monetary conversion, and the mechanism of the conversion from cash into bank deposit and 
digital money, makes the 2016 demonetisation a very interesting case study in the analysis of 
the legal and institutional impact of monetary transition. More importantly, it helps to shine a 
light on the challenges faced by states when moving towards a cashless society.  In this section, 
I will analyse the relationship between monetary transition and property rights.  
 
A. The Relationship Between Conversions and Property Rights 
The key legal challenges in any monetary transition, whether it entails a debasement, a 
demonetisation, or de-cashing, is to protect money-holders’ monetary wealth while addressing 
whatever policy needs the measure aims at. Consequently, most monetary transitions entail 
heavy costs and end up constituting an informal tax for money holders. In early medieval 
England, the renovation monetae, the process whereby kings periodically changed the types of 
coins in circulation and declared invalid the old ones, forced individuals to procure the new 
                                                     
66 Alok Prasanna Kumar, ‘Demonetisation and the Rule of Law’, Economic and Political Weekly 19 
(December 10, 2016); Indira Jaising, ‘Demonetisation: Strictly, the PM Didn’t Go by The Law’, 
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Economic and Political Consequences of India's Demonetization’ (2017) 
69 See, note 66 above 
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coins by going to the mint and paying a fee to get the old coins melted.70 This de facto imposed 
a tax on commerce in the same way the adoption of new digital payment methods now forces 
users to pay for the access to digital payment technology71 Not surprisingly, even then, it caused 
uproar. One of the earliest modern treatises on money, the 14th century De Moneta by Nicholas 
Oresme, was written to challenge the social repercussions of such debasement. In the treatise 
Nicholas Oresme argued that lowering the metal content of coins imposed by Philip IV reduced 
purchasing power and affected particularly badly those owing fixed rents and receiving fixed 
wages.72 In sum, it affected the poor.  
The reason why monetary transitions are sometimes loathed is because they affect existing 
property rights. The institutional economics literature has demonstrated that economic 
development is dependent from a structured system of property rights that give individuals 
legal protection.73 Without the certainty that property will be protected, and property rights 
enforced by law, firms and individuals will have to incur extra costs for the protection of their 
assets and will have less incentives to trade. For this reason, the right to property is one of the 
fundamental pillars of modern societies, protected in Constitutions and international treaties. 
For instance, according to Article 300A of the Indian Constitution, “No person shall be 
deprived of his property save by authority of law”.74 Yet, as the very same provision shows, 
the right to property always has to be balanced with the sometimes concurrent public interest 
of the state to achieve wider societal gains. The concept of ‘compulsory purchase’ or ‘eminent 
domain’ which allows the government to expropriate property from individuals for a price 
without their consent shows that the right of property is flexible enough to adapt to various 
societal needs.75 As long as the reduction of property rights is imposed ‘by authority of law’ 
and according to predefined criteria, infringements of property rights are tolerated.    
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Money in the form of notes is a particular kind of property right – in common law – a personal 
property right.76 More specifically, in the common law, notes are considered a form of 
documentary intangible property, known in finance law as “chose in action”.77 Unlike physical 
property, notes are a form of property in which the property is a promise to pay embodied in a 
document – the banknote.78 In their deposit-taking function and, especially, as guarantors of 
the money supply and money in circulation, central banks issue notes that, in theory, are 
redeemable upon request by whomever presents them at the bank. This is why now currency 
is, legally speaking, a liability for central banks. In the early days of central banking, notes 
were convertible into gold at a predefined rate. Since the demise of the Gold Standard era, 
however, we have moved to a concept of money as “fiat” currency, meaning that the value of 
the note is not a function of the commodity to which it is linked but simply of the credibility 
of the central bank as controller of the value of the money in circulation. More simply, the 
value of the banknote is whatever the state determines it to be. In practical terms, while notes 
are a liability of the state, a banknote holder can only exchange them for other fiat money of 
the same value.79 Indeed, in most states, including India and the UK, notes are exactly the 
physical representation of a claim of an equal sum of money towards the central bank that 
issued them.80 
The decision to demonetise notes does not by itself constitute a violation of the constitutional 
right to property.81 Governments retain in the context of their role as guardians of the currency 
the right to change the legal tender, as much as to formulate monetary policies that by 
controlling the level of inflation influence the purchasing power of money. However, the 
decision to demonetise must be accompanied by the supply of an equal amount of money of 
different kind, so that the total amount of money in circulation is preserved, and individuals’ 
property rights over their cash are not reduced. The conversion of notes, as bothering as it 
might be for the banknote holders, is fundamental for the preservation of their personal 
property rights over the currency as its value will not diminish. Moreover, it is fundamental to 
guarantee the same stability of the currency. Indeed, given that the economic value of money 
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77 Ibid, at 47 
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is a direct function of the trust in the government that issues it, as opposed to the nominal value 
of the notes as legal tender, any action that leads to a distrust in the ability of the government 
to control its commercial value will undoubtedly diminish its role in the economy. In practice, 
there are three types of conversions: conversion into cash, into bank deposits, and into 
electronic money (e-money). I will discuss the first two in this section. The third one will be 
analysed in the next section because of its complexity.  
 
B. Conversion from Cash into Cash 
Demonetisations most of the time entail a banknote swap. Legally speaking, banknote holders 
retain the right to convert their notes for new notes for an equivalent total value at no extra 
cost. Note swap is the most common strategy during demonetisations. Under UK law, if the 
Bank of England exercises its call-in power thereby withdrawing certain notes from circulation, 
it has nonetheless the same obligation to convert them into different notes of the same value if 
it is asked to do so by the banknote bearer.82 Indeed, the Bank of England does not have any 
power to write off its outstanding liabilities in the form of notes under any circumstances and 
it remains liable for the value of the notes indefinitely.83 The only change is the status of the 
demonetised notes that cease to be legal tender.84 In the Indian 2016 demonetisation, banknote 
holders were giving the possibility to convert 500 and 1000 Rs notes for other denomination 
notes, including the higher denomination 2000 Rs notes.85 The swap could be done at one of 
the 16000 banks in operation in India as long as it was done by the 31st of December 2016: six 
weeks from the announcement date.86  
Yet, although the conversion guarantees that the total monetary value at disposal of the 
banknote holder does not change, the procedures to implement the actual conversion can 
nonetheless entail substantial costs. These costs might de facto reduce the purchasing power of 
notes and, hence, affect property rights. In monetary transitions, demonetised notes holders are 
usually given a certain amount of time to convert the old notes into new notes, after which the 
notes will not be convertible any longer. For instance, in the largest conversion ever done, the 
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entering into force of the Euro in January 2002, banknote holders were advised of the incoming 
monetary change years in advance, and were given from ten to twenty years and, in certain 
cases, unlimited time to exercise their conversion rights, depending on the specific monetary 
circumstances of the country.87 Giving a longer window to convert notes will reduce the risk 
of massive queues at the banks as holders will not be forced to rush to swap them for newly 
issued notes. Moreover, leaving a transition period in which demonetised notes are still free to 
circulate would reduce panic and give extra time for the payment system to adjust.  
In the Indian demonetisation, the lack of proper preparation for the transition led to huge 
conversion costs, which ultimately amounted to an informal tax on banknote holders.88 Even 
worse, perhaps, it amounted to a tax that impacted disproportionally on the poor. In order to 
guarantee secrecy, the government chose not to announce the demonetisation plan to anyone, 
including the higher management of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). The RBI was the agency 
in charge of the Indian payment system and tasked with the printing of Indian Rupee notes. 
The lack of preparation on the side of the RBI meant that banks in charge of the actual swapping 
of the notes did not have enough notes of different denominations in their branches and ATMs. 
It took weeks before the RBI printed enough new notes and banks had enough supply of 
currency to disburse. Moreover, unlike for other demonetisations, the government did not give 
a transitional window during which the demonetised notes still had legal effect. Instead, the 
intervention made the demonetised notes illegal from the very next day and gave holders a 
grace period of only 72 hours after which no more transaction was to be allowed.89  
The ultimate outcomes were days of queues in front of banks, and a sudden loss of wealth for 
the portion of the demonetised notes that could not be converted. In economic terms, the costs 
of transitioning were extremely high for those individuals whose labour-income to total-
income ratio was high – in other words, with no savings - as one or two days of work lost 
queueing meant a sudden drop of 10% of monthly income. Some reports even mentioned 
deaths taking place at the queues due to the extreme heat.90 Further to that, the inability to 
convert the notes within the stipulated time meant a sudden loss of wealth that could be 
paralleled only to a massive sudden currency depreciation or hyperinflation. Even here, those 
who bore the burden the most were those individuals who has no immediate access to banks, 
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such as people living in rural villages, disabled or impaired individuals. The low reactivity was 
due in part to the lack of access to proper information and guidance on the demonetisation 
decision and how to react.91 In her research on what she defines as ‘information poverty’, 
Elfreda Chatman shows that marginalized groups have comparatively less access to 
information and, for this reason, are usually in the worst position to respond to crises.92  
 
C. Conversion from Cash into Bank Deposits 
More challenging is the conversion of notes into bank deposits that occurs with de-cashing. In 
this case, in order to protect existing property rights, the level of money in the form of notes in 
circulation is to be reduced, to be compensated with a parallel increase of money in the form 
of bank deposits. In contemporary financial systems, money is commonly understood as taking 
the form of bank deposits, which represent the large majority of money in circulation. 
Currency, on the other hand, accounts for less than 3% of the total broad money.93 Currency, 
in turn, is largely made by notes, which in the United Kingdom account for about 94% of the 
cash in circulation, and by coins.94 India, in this respect is very different from many other 
countries, as its monetary base has a much higher ratio of cash over deposit.  
From a legal perspective, bank deposits and currency are two very different types of money. 
While bank deposits are IOUs from commercial banks to consumers, currency is an IOU from 
the Central bank to consumers.95 Thus, conversions from cash into deposits means that when 
the banknote holder deposits cash into a private bank, the original liability of the central bank 
attached to the notes will disappear and, from the point of view of the banknote holder, it will 
be substituted with the liability of the bank towards its depositor. Hence, the banknote holder 
will not hold cash in the form of a banknote but only in the form of a credit balance towards its 
bank. The bank, in turn, will deposit all the notes to the central bank, which will convert them 
into central bank deposit.  
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The same would apply, even if a government decided to convert cash into a new e-currency, in 
which case the notes shall be substituted for e-cash on par.96 From a macroeconomic 
perspective, a conversion of cash into a non-cash instrument - which in theory could also entail 
virtual currencies in the future - would probably be beneficial for banks as it would increase 
liquidity in the banking system and, therefore, lead to credit creation.97  
However, the same conversion could impose transaction costs on individuals. At the outset, it 
is important to stress that cash provides fundamental challenges, such as the risk that the 
banknotes might being lost, damaged or stolen, which in turn does add a cost on the money 
holder, especially the only savings are in the form of banknotes. Yet, the conversion from cash 
to bank deposits is not free form risks either. On a general level, it would mean that since all 
their assets would be in the form of bank deposits, individuals would now have to bear the risks 
of bank insolvencies or bank liquidity problems. Essentially, this moves the financial risks of 
cash from the State – which is always responsible for the currency in circulation – to 
individuals. On a micro-level, it means that every monetary transaction would incur a fee, 
thereby increasing the costs of making payments, not to mention the time costs of traveling to 
the nearest branch to perform the payment. Indeed, the value of money is made by the nominal 
value of the money and the cost of using it. If, for instance, getting cash would cost a day-worth 
of work, then the value of notes would increase. We can see that from the history of notes in 
the 18th and 19th century United States. Notes issued by a bank in St Louis would not trade at 
par when used in New York, but they were worth less. More specifically, they were worth the 
face-value of the note minus the cost of travel that someone would have incurred to redeem 
them in gold at the issuing bank.98  
From a policy perspective, while de-cashing does protect existing property rights on paper, it 
does not always achieve this in practice. Transferring the credit risk from the state to banks 
does not pose problems as long as mechanisms are in place to protect bank creditors: chiefly 
among them, strong prudential and supervisory frameworks and a deposit insurance scheme. 
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This, however, is not possible in many developing countries as the financial and institutional 
systems are not robust enough, and deposit protection is very low or inexistent. Yet, the biggest 
legal challenges are faced by those that do not have a bank account: mostly the poor. For them, 
unless the monetary transition is accompanied by regulatory measures that make it easier for 
unbanked individuals to open bank accounts, there is a very high risk that de-cashing would 
amount to an expropriation.  
 
V. ACCESS TO TECHNOLOGY AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 
The third type of monetary transition envisages a conversion of cash into e-money to perform 
digital payments, mostly through mobile phones, e-wallets, or cards. In the 2016 
demonetisation, neither Prime Minister Modi’s speech nor the Gazette of India official 
notification mentioned the transition to a cashless society as a stated objective of the 
demonetisation.99 Yet, one of the key narratives in the immediate aftermath of the decision was 
that demonetisation was essential to encourage the use of e-payment mechanism to move India 
into a cashless future.100 This initiative was part of the broader Cashless India campaign to 
propel the country into a digital payment economy.101 In fact, the very next day after the 
announcements, many Indian newspapers published advertisements of digital payment services 
on their front-page, while advocates for the switch to digital payments immediately welcomed 
the PM’s decision.102  
 
A. Conversion from Cash into E-Money 
Since the early 2000s, technological innovations in payments led to the emergence of a new 
generation of payment providers, mostly offering retail payment solutions. Unlike their 
predecessors (and now, competitors), digital payment providers offer payment services outside 
of the classical payment network and instead rely on software-based solutions to intermediate 
funds. These new payment services, like Apple Pay, PayPal, Alipay, and M-Pesa, to mention 
just the best known, bypass the cash and banking channels, and instead rely on mobile phones 
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apps, e-wallets available on phone or online, or, more rarely, cards.103 The rise of digital 
payments is occurring all over the world and many commentators predict this to be the future 
of retail payments. For this reason, understanding the mechanisms of monetary transition from 
cash to e-money is all more important.  
Despite the huge variety in digital payment solutions, we can identify two types of digital 
payments, each one of them entails different conversion costs.104 The first type simply entails 
a transfer of bank deposits from one depositor to another through the use of a bank’s phone 
app or the internet, which simply transmit payment instruction to the originating bank or point 
of sale. Thus, while payments are processed electronically via a mobile phone app or through 
a card, there is actually no difference between these and a payment through an electronic bank 
transfer. When it comes to transition costs, both the payer and the payee need to have a bank 
account, and since the funds are intermediated through their banks, the analysis in the previous 
section IV(c) applies.  
More interesting is the second type of digital payment. This time, the value intermediated is in 
the form of virtual currency or ‘e-money’, rather than bank deposit. This is by far the most 
common way of performing e-payments in developing countries as many payers are unbanked 
and living in areas where financial infrastructures are inexistent. In this case, the issuing 
institution, usually a telecom company or a bank, issues the virtual currency – the ‘e-money’ - 
in exchange for cash or deposit money. The e-money is a digital representation of value 
denominated in fiat currency that is stored in a virtual account called e-wallet available on 
phones or cards.105 This e-wallet is nothing more than a service to store and visualize the 
quantity of e-money available to the user, and to perform payment transfer of e-money to other 
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e-wallets holders. 106 Key for these digital payment systems is the use of agents, which not only 
intermediate e-money through their accounts, but crucially act as ‘human’ bank branches 
signing up new clients and disbursing cash in exchange for clients’ e-money.107  
 
B. Access to Technology as a Transition Cost 
Mobile payments are now considered one of the essential tools for financial development.108 
Not surprisingly, economists, politicians, and various organizations welcomed a more 
widespread adoption of digital payments. In the Indian Government’s original plan, the de-
cashing of high-value notes would have spurred the use of e-payment systems such as PayTM 
or PhonePe, in lieu of cash. The (apparent) reasoning behind this was that those cash-holders 
who could not or did not want to convert their cash into deposits or new currency, would have 
converted their cash into e-money through one of the various mobile payment systems 
available in India. Yet, evidence shows that the shift from cash to digital payments entails 
substantial transition costs as it requires that all users be digitally included: in other words, to 
have access to digital payment technology.  
The first problem is of a financial nature. The literature on digital finance, for the most part, 
does not take into full consideration the total costs of purchasing a mobile device for 
individuals. Although mobile banking for development does not need sophisticated 
smartphones to operate payment platforms, very basic mobile phones being sufficient, it is not 
necessarily true that purchasing and using a mobile phone with payment technology does not 
require a financial effort from certain parts of the population. Even though mobile phones can 
be purchased cheaply, their cost-to-income ratio is not negligible for a family that survives on 
less than two dollars a day.109 For instance, even in a country with a very high level of mobile 
penetration such as India, 35% of the adult population still does not have access to mobile 
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telephony.110 In the least developed countries, this percentage can be much higher. Moving to 
digital payments would leave 35% of the population without any access to commerce. While 
large transactions can offset the cost of technology, this is not the same for small transactions. 
The difference is particularly important because small transactions are predominant among the 
poor, who very seldom engage in medium and large payments.111 Thus, e-payments command 
a premium for the poor that does not apply to more wealthy individuals. 
More importantly, social studies have demonstrated that lack of literacy, and especially digital 
and financial literacy, can prevent access to digital payments. 112 For a person who is unable to 
read and write and has very limited understanding of the role of banks, moving from cash to e-
payments requires a huge leap of faith. Individuals might not be able to read the instructions 
on the phone, or simply not understand that a mobile phone message would constitute a 
payment.113 Indeed, it is a well-known problem that a lack of digital literacy and financial 
literacy is responsible for the distrust against mobile banking widespread in rural villages 
where the level of education is lower.114 Moreover, studies show that digital illiteracy can easily 
lead to abuse and fraud against payment users. Mobile banking agents, who act as 
intermediaries between mobile banking operators and end-users, might defraud customers, for 
instance by transferring money to their own account without the customer’s knowledge.115 
Finally, in order to function, mobile payment and electronic payments need a very extensive 
and reliable telecom network and infrastructure.116  Indeed, without extensive coverage, 
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merchants and consumers will be unable to operate even the most basic transactions.117 In this 
regard, empirical literature shows that distrust of the reliability of the telecom network can 
discourage potential new customers from signing up to mobile payment schemes and, more 
worryingly, lead to fraud and permanent loss of customers who decide to return to cash.118 In 
India, where power outages are common, and where the internet infrastructure is not well 
developed, digital payment infrastructures cannot be relied upon as the main channel to support 
the payment system.  
Fortunately, in the Indian demonetisation, demonetised note holders were not confined to the 
use of e-payments. Yet, the challenges of converting cash into digital payment experienced in 
India can teach an important lesson for the future, as all countries sooner or later will have to 
move to a less cash-intensive economy. Indeed, there is increasing evidence that behavioural 
challenges in using and understanding e-payments, and network and coverage problems can 
indeed constitute huge barriers to the successful rise of a cashless economy everywhere, 
including the UK.119  
 
VI. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS ON DEMONETISATIONS AND SOCIAL 
EQUALITY 
The 2016 Indian demonetisation in many ways exemplifies the challenges of monetary 
transitions. As correctly argued by Christine Desan, money is first and foremost a constitutional 
project: a governance strategy orchestrated by policymakers to mobilize resources.120 In this 
light, the Indian demonetisation situates itself in the struggle to achieve useful monetary 
innovations and enhanced security, while at the same time preserving property rights and social 
equality. This paper showed that monetary changes can entail substantive transition costs. 
These are, unfortunately, disproportionally higher for the poor and other marginalized groups, 
as they, more than others, rely on cash, very rarely have bank accounts, and are much less 
familiar and confident with digital payment technology. Ultimately, transition costs undermine 
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existing property rights and, thus, lead to wealth reduction, insecurity, and weakened 
confidence in monetary institutions.  
 
A. Transition Costs and Property Rights: A Recap 
In the context of a monetary change, the transition from one form of money to another, although 
motivated by compelling policy reasons, should not occur at a cost to money holders, who 
enjoy pre-existing property rights over their cash. Just as there would be a violation of the right 
to property over a piece of land if the access is suddenly blocked, so does any measure that 
makes it more difficult for money holders to convert their demonetised cash into new money. 
When notes are declared invalid without any means for people to change them into e-money 
or deposit, or more difficult to convert them in other denomination notes, then those people 
will find themselves locked out of the payment system with no way to use their cash. This is 
nothing less than an expropriation, and as such it should be motivated with precise reasons of 
public interest. 121 Hence, if we can draw one key lesson from the Indian demonetisation, this 
is that for monetary transitions to respect property rights, it is  necessary that for every single 
citizen, the reduction in circulating money is mirrored by a parallel increase in bank-deposits 
or electronic money. In other words, it requires an institutional guarantee that a banknote holder 
possessing 40.000 Rupees in demonetised cash savings will retain the same amount of money 
in the new form without having to incur fees or extra costs. Only then, can monetary transitions 
achieve social equality.  
In order for a monetary transition to work, it is first and foremost necessary to guarantee that 
conversion costs are minimized. Preparation is essential and that is, primarily, a government’s 
duty, no different than ensuring good bank supervision or preventing counterfeit notes. First, 
as I argued earlier, sudden changes are cataclysmic for the economy as they only lead to chaos 
and increased uncertainty. Thus, it is necessary to notify in advance of the forthcoming 
monetary change in order for citizens and firms to prepare, or to give enough time for the 
conversion to be completed. In the Indian case, the ATM and bank branch infrastructures were 
not adequately prepared to disburse new bank notes, which left millions of demonetised note 
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holders without any money to spend. Second, in the transition from cash to new legal tender 
notes, it is necessary to guarantee that note holders will incur no extra requirements to convert 
their notes, and no limits on the amount of money in demonetised notes that can be converted. 
Any extra fee is, essentially, a tax on the use of money use and, as such, should not be imposed 
arbitrarily. More importantly, to use such a fee as an extra rent for private companies such as 
banks or e-payment operators should be avoided at all cost.  
More critically, monetary transitions need to guarantee equal access to the payment 
mechanisms to which users are transitioning to. For instance, in the transition from cash to 
bank deposits or e-money, it is necessary to deploy policies that guarantee free access to banks 
for all individuals, and the availability of e-payment methods easy enough to operate for 
individuals with no digital literacy and at no extra cost. In a country like India where 50% of 
the population does not have a bank account, the Indian demonetisation ended up leaving 
unbanked note holders unable to convert their currency into deposits, thereby expropriating 
them. It was even more complicated for individuals to mobilize cash through the mobile 
payment system.  
 
B. Discriminations 
In the context of monetary transition, it is also important to guarantee that the shift from one 
type of money or payment to another does not disproportionately affect certain groups over 
others. Since in fiat monetary systems the value of money is set by the state, in the exercise of 
its power to decide what constitutes money and what qualifies as legal tender, governments 
have not only an obligation to manage inflation, but also the concurrent obligation to guarantee 
that 1 state-unit of money in the form of bank note is no less valuable than 1 unit of money as 
bank deposit or e-money. Any measure that differentiates by law or in practice different types 
of money by making them more expensive can only lead to inequalities, as it will have impact 
certain social groups more than others.  
The Indian demonetisation achieved the very opposite. It imposed a series of requirements that 
favoured digital payment users over bank users, and favoured bank users over unbanked cash 
holders. In the 2016 Indian demonetisation, note holders were given incentives to convert notes 
into bank deposits. The Gazette of India notification on demonetisation published the next day 
explicitly discriminated between banked and unbanked note holders. While holders of 
demonetised notes with a bank account could convert them into bank deposit with no limit, 
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unbanked individuals could convert them into cash only for a total amount of 4,000 Rs.122  
Moreover, no requirement was imposed on the conversion of money into e-money through 
mobile wallets or credit cards. While justified with the need to control black money, those 
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